Stable equilibrium in beliefs in extensive games with perfect information
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Publication:5941433
DOI10.1016/S0165-1889(99)00080-9zbMath0979.91010MaRDI QIDQ5941433
Publication date: 20 August 2001
Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Fundamental topics (basic mathematics, methodology; applicable to economics in general) (91B02) Games in extensive form (91A18) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)
Related Items (5)
``Agreeing to disagree type results: a decision-theoretic approach. ⋮ Stability, sequential rationality, and subgame consistency ⋮ Conservative stable standards of behavior and \(\varphi\)-stable sets ⋮ General systems and \(\varphi\)-stable sets --- a formal analysis of socioeconomic environments ⋮ The foundation of stability in extensive games with perfect information
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