Comparing competition and collusion: a numerical approach.
From MaRDI portal
Publication:5942328
DOI10.1007/PL00004128zbMath1049.91044OpenAlexW2015224393MaRDI QIDQ5942328
Publication date: 28 August 2001
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/pl00004128
Related Items
Identification and estimation in sequential, asymmetric, English auctions ⋮ Semiparametric identification and estimation in multi-object, English auctions ⋮ Bidder collusion ⋮ Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ Private monitoring in auctions ⋮ Weak and strong multimarket bidding rings ⋮ Shapley-Folkman-Lyapunov theorem and asymmetric first price auctions ⋮ Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions. ⋮ Are there common values in first-price auctions? A tail-index nonparametric test ⋮ Uniqueness in symmetric first-price auctions with affiliation ⋮ Bayesian estimation approaches to first-price auctions ⋮ Qualitative analysis of Bayes-Nash equilibrium in weak asymmetric auctions ⋮ Identification in first-price and Dutch auctions when the number of potential bidders is unobservable ⋮ Asymmetric first price auctions ⋮ Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values ⋮ Uniqueness of the equilibrium in first-price auctions ⋮ Competitive bidding in asymmetric multidimensional public procurement ⋮ Uniform price auctions with a last accepted bid pricing rule ⋮ Biased procurement auctions ⋮ Numerical solutions of asymmetric, first-price, independent private values auctions ⋮ Using simulation methods for bayesian econometric models: inference, development,and communication ⋮ Numerical Solution of Asymmetric Auctions ⋮ Adversarial Risk Analysis for Auctions Using Mirror Equilibrium and Bayes Nash Equilibrium ⋮ Reference Bayesian inference in nonregular models.
Uses Software
