Cost sharing: The nondifferentiable case

DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(01)00052-0zbMath1007.91030WikidataQ127360308 ScholiaQ127360308MaRDI QIDQ5943173

Ori Haimanko

Publication date: 16 March 2003

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Aumann-Shapley price mechanismcost sharing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (3)

Scarcity, competition, and value ⋮ A generalization of the Aumann-Shapley value for risk capital allocation problems ⋮ Solutions for non-negatively weighted TU games derived from extension operators

Cites Work

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• The Shapley value in the non differentiable case
• Inversion and characterization of the hemispherical transform
• Internal Telephone Billing Rates—A Novel Application of Non-Atomic Game Theory
• An Application of the Aumann-Shapley Prices for Cost Allocation in Transportation Problems
• Producer Incentives in Cost Allocation
• Potential, Value, and Consistency
• Demand Compatible Equitable Cost Sharing Prices
• Values of Non-Atomic Games
• Allocation of Shared Costs: A Set of Axioms Yielding A Unique Procedure
• Convex Analysis

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