Cooperation and computability in \(n\)-player games
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Publication:5946255
DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(00)00068-8zbMath0987.91007OpenAlexW2094450813MaRDI QIDQ5946255
Hamid Sabourian, Luca Anderlini
Publication date: 20 June 2002
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(00)00068-8
Cooperative games (91A12) Games with infinitely many players (91A07) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
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Cites Work
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