Cooperation and computability in \(n\)-player games

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(00)00068-8zbMath0987.91007OpenAlexW2094450813MaRDI QIDQ5946255

Hamid Sabourian, Luca Anderlini

Publication date: 20 June 2002

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(00)00068-8

zbMATH Keywords

perturbationcooperationcomputabilityrepeat common interest games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games with infinitely many players (91A07) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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Cites Work

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