Common knowledge and consensus with noisy communication

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(00)00073-1zbMath0980.91008WikidataQ126802999 ScholiaQ126802999MaRDI QIDQ5946256

Frédéric Koessler

Publication date: 2001

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumcommon knowledgeconjecturesconsensusnoisy communication protocols

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items

Learning to agree over large state spaces, Communication, timing, and common learning, On consensus through communication without a commonly known protocol, Pragmatic languages with universal grammars, A model of belief influence in large social networks

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