Sex-oriented stable matchings of the marriage problem with correlated and incomplete information

DOI10.1016/S0378-4371(01)00305-3zbMath0974.91002arXivcond-mat/0104338OpenAlexW3100744201MaRDI QIDQ5947889

Paolo Laureti, Guido Caldarelli, Andrea Capocci

Publication date: 23 October 2001

Published in: Physica A (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/cond-mat/0104338

zbMATH Keywords

costly informationmutual preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

Related Items (5)

Matching games with partial information ⋮ Potential-partnership networks and the dynamical structure of monogamous populations ⋮ Statistical mechanics of a simplified bipartite matching problem: An analytical treatment ⋮ The stable marriage problem: an interdisciplinary review from the physicist's perspective ⋮ Editorial: Tails and ties

Cites Work

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• A self-organized model for network evolution
• Equilibrium points in n -person games
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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