Scoring rules, Condorcet efficiency and social homogeneity

DOI10.1023/A:1005257316414zbMath0989.91024MaRDI QIDQ5948903

Dominique Lepelley, Patrick Pierron, Fabrice Valognes

Publication date: 9 April 2002

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

plurality ruleBorda rulecondorcet criteriasocial homogeneityvoting rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (7)

Condorcet Efficiency of General Weighted Scoring Rules Under IAC: Indifference and Abstention ⋮ Voting with rubber bands, weights, and strings ⋮ The effectiveness of weighted scoring rules when pairwise majority rule cycles exist. ⋮ The scoring rules in an endogenous election ⋮ The unexpected behavior of plurality rule ⋮ On the model dependence of majority preference relations reconstructed from ballot or survey data ⋮ Which scoring rule maximizes condorcet efficiency under IAC?

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