Evolution and information in a gift-giving game

DOI10.1006/jeth.2001.2823zbMath0996.91025OpenAlexW2102741148MaRDI QIDQ5952422

No author found.

Publication date: 6 November 2002

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/dd0bd81a374326ca771e0c9d36ab236713589404

zbMATH Keywords

learninginformationevolutionrepeated games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (3)

Are we nice(r) to nice(r) people?-an experimental analysis ⋮ The evolution of cooperation through imitation ⋮ A ``super folk theorem for dynastic repeated games

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Social Norms and Community Enforcement
• p-Dominance and Belief Potential
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions

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