Conflict and cooperation. The structure of equilibrium payoffs in common agency

DOI10.1006/jeth.2000.2702zbMath0996.91029OpenAlexW1480238767MaRDI QIDQ5952425

Didier Laussel, Michel Le Breton

Publication date: 6 November 2002

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2000.2702

zbMATH Keywords

common agencyequilibrium payoffstruthful equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80)

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Cites Work

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• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Efficient private production of public goods under common agency
• On coalition-proof Nash equilibria in common agency games
• Cores of convex games
• Lobbying and Welfare in a Representative Democracy
• Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
• Common Agency
• Equilibrium Points in Nonzero-Sum n-Person Submodular Games
• Efficiency and Decentralization in the Pure Theory of Public Goods
• Complements and substitutes in common agency

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