When the weak win: the role of investment in environmental lobbying

DOI10.1006/JEEM.2000.1147zbMath1011.91047OpenAlexW1965641476MaRDI QIDQ5953252

Richard Damania

Publication date: 31 May 2003

Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeem.2000.1147

zbMATH Keywords

priceinvestmentconsumptioncompetitive numeraire sectorlobbyingmonopolyoutputpolitical equilibriumpolluting good

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Corporate finance (dividends, real options, etc.) (91G50)

Related Items (1)

CROSS-COUNTRY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND POLITICALLY DRIVEN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS

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