General systems and \(\varphi\)-stable sets --- a formal analysis of socioeconomic environments

DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(01)00065-9zbMath1006.91012MaRDI QIDQ5955032

Xiao Luo

Publication date: 12 March 2003

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

latticesgeneral systems\(\varphi\)-stable setsrationalizabilityTarski's fixed point theorem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (13)

Rationalizability in general situations ⋮ Possibilistic beliefs in strategic games ⋮ Iterated elimination procedures ⋮ Iterated strict dominance in general games ⋮ Cooperative Games (Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets) ⋮ Networks and Stability ⋮ Stability, sequential rationality, and subgame consistency ⋮ Deriving Nash equilibria as the supercore for a relational system ⋮ Conservative stable standards of behavior and \(\varphi\)-stable sets ⋮ Bayesian coalitional rationalizability ⋮ On the foundation of stability ⋮ The foundation of stability in extensive games with perfect information ⋮ The role of monotonicity in the epistemic analysis of strategic games

Cites Work

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