Stable voting procedures for committees in economic environments

DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(01)00068-4zbMath1022.91005OpenAlexW2026325549WikidataQ127682247 ScholiaQ127682247MaRDI QIDQ5955034

Hans Keiding, Bezalel Peleg

Publication date: 28 October 2003

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(01)00068-4

zbMATH Keywords

representationstrong Nash equilibriavotingsimple games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (4)

Representation of effectivity functions by acceptable game forms: a complete characterization ⋮ On the continuity of representations of effectivity functions ⋮ Computing the strong Nash equilibrium for Markov chains games ⋮ Computing the strong \(L_p\)-Nash equilibrium for Markov chains games: convergence and uniqueness

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