Trade fragmentation and coordination in strategic market games
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Publication:5956285
DOI10.1006/jeth.2000.2730zbMath1011.91067OpenAlexW2037539186MaRDI QIDQ5956285
Publication date: 31 May 2003
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2000.2730
Noncooperative games (91A10) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Trade models (91B60)
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