Cournot outcome and optimal collusion: An example

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(01)00527-4zbMath1002.91003OpenAlexW2084865597MaRDI QIDQ5958360

Harrison H. C. Cheng

Publication date: 3 March 2002

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(01)00527-4

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic oligopolycollusioncournot outcome

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
• Noncooperative price taking in large dynamic markets
• Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players
• Optimal cartel trigger price strategies
• Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames

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