A negative result in finitely repeated games with product monitoring

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(01)00534-1zbMath1001.91005MaRDI QIDQ5958369

Tadashi Sekiguchi

Publication date: 3 March 2002

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesimperfect information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (2)

General properties of long-run supergames ⋮ Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring

Cites Work

• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies

This page was built for publication: A negative result in finitely repeated games with product monitoring