On decision-theoretic foundations for defaults

DOI10.1016/S0004-3702(01)00140-0zbMath0984.68139OpenAlexW2034935732WikidataQ57233884 ScholiaQ57233884MaRDI QIDQ5958391

Nir Friedman, Ronen I. Brafman

Publication date: 3 March 2002

Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0004-3702(01)00140-0

zbMATH Keywords

decision theorysemanticsnon-monotonic reasoningdefaults

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problem solving in the context of artificial intelligence (heuristics, search strategies, etc.) (68T20)

Related Items (2)

Set-structured and cost-sharing heuristics for classical planning ⋮ Computer science and decision theory

Cites Work

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• The effect of knowledge on belief: Conditioning, specificity and the lottery paradox in default reasoning
• What does a conditional knowledge base entail?
• The logic of conditionals. An application of probability to deductive logic
• Qualitative probabilities for default reasoning, belief revision, and causal modeling
• Lexicographic Probabilities and Choice Under Uncertainty
• Nozick's Acceptance Rule and the Lottery Paradox

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