The virtue of being underestimated: A note on discriminatory contracts in hidden information models

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(01)00630-9zbMath1003.91509OpenAlexW2132348878MaRDI QIDQ5958446

Wendelin Schnedler

Publication date: 3 March 2002

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(01)00630-9

zbMATH Keywords

adverse selectionstatistical discriminationstochastic order relation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

• Ranking agencies under moral hazard
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