Low and high types in asymmetric first-price auctions

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(01)00611-5zbMath1004.91025OpenAlexW2022067774MaRDI QIDQ5958462

Aner Sela, Gadi Fibich, Arieh Gavious

Publication date: 3 March 2002

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(01)00611-5

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric auctionsfirst-price auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (4)

A NOTE ON THE EFFECT OF ASYMMETRY ON REVENUE IN SECOND-PRICE AUCTIONS ⋮ Numerical simulations of asymmetric first-price auctions ⋮ The optimal sorting of players in contests between groups ⋮ Asymmetric first price auctions

Cites Work

• Numerical analysis of asymmetric first price auctions
• Asymmetric Auctions
• Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions

This page was built for publication: Low and high types in asymmetric first-price auctions