Informed principal, moral hazard, and the value of a more informative technology

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(01)00557-2zbMath0995.91008OpenAlexW3124914731WikidataQ126771942 ScholiaQ126771942MaRDI QIDQ5958520

Randy Silvers, Hector Chade

Publication date: 3 March 2002

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(01)00557-2

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardinformed principalprincipal-agent

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18)

Related Items (7)

Comparing allocations under asymmetric information: Coase theorem revisited ⋮ Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values ⋮ Informed-principal problem with moral hazard, risk neutrality, and no limited liability ⋮ The value of information in a principal-agent model with moral hazard: the ex post contracting case ⋮ The strategically ignorant principal ⋮ Firm-fit transparency and incentives ⋮ Informed principal, moral hazard, and the value of a more informative technology

Cites Work

• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
• Efficiency of an Information System in an Agency Model
• Information Control in the Principal-Agent Problem
• Informed principal, moral hazard, and the value of a more informative technology

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