What can we learn from simulating a standard agency model?

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(01)00474-8zbMath1056.91518OpenAlexW2031468406WikidataQ126773794 ScholiaQ126773794MaRDI QIDQ5958676

M. A. Robe

Publication date: 3 March 2002

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(01)00474-8

zbMATH Keywords

Numerical analysisLimited liabilityMoral hazardReduced-form equation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cites Work

• Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
• Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
• Optimal contracting of separable production technologies
• The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems

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