A new solution to the random assignment problem.

DOI10.1006/jeth.2000.2710zbMath1134.91357OpenAlexW2014437184WikidataQ56609436 ScholiaQ56609436MaRDI QIDQ5958895

Hervé Moulin, Anna Bogomolnaia

Publication date: 20 March 2002

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2000.2710

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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Cites Work

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• A simple random assignment problem with a unique solution
• Ordinal efficiency and dominated sets of assignments.
• On cores and indivisibility
• On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems
• Scheduling with Opting Out: Improving upon Random Priority
• Straightforwardness of Game Forms with Lotteries as Outcomes
• Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems

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