Endogenous entry and exit in common value auctions

DOI10.1023/A:1011432705173zbMath1004.91027OpenAlexW4235611544MaRDI QIDQ5959116

James T. Swarthout, James C. Cox, Sam Dinkin

Publication date: 20 March 2002

Published in: Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1011432705173

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsmarket equilibriumexperimental economicsbidding theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (3)

Barking up the right tree: Are small groups rational agents? ⋮ Continuous ascending vs. pooled multiple unit auctions ⋮ An experiment on first-price common-value auctions with asymmetric information structures: the blessed winner

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