Core solutions in vector-valued games

DOI10.1023/A:1013606007132zbMath1005.91016WikidataQ58217348 ScholiaQ58217348MaRDI QIDQ5959913

Francisco Ramón Fernández García, Miguel A. Hinojosa, Justo Puerto

Publication date: 11 April 2002

Published in: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

coremulticriteria gamenondominated

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (21)

Multi-criteria minimum cost spanning tree games ⋮ Set-valued TU-games ⋮ CORES OF STOCHASTIC COOPERATIVE GAMES WITH STOCHASTIC ORDERS ⋮ The Joint Belief Function and Shapley Value for the Joint Cooperative Game ⋮ Stable solutions for multiple scenario cost allocation games with partial information ⋮ On minimax and Pareto optimal security payoffs in multicriteria games ⋮ Stable sets and cores for multi-criteria simple games and for their extensions ⋮ The Shapley-Shubik index for multi-criteria simple games ⋮ Cooperative interval games: a survey ⋮ Set-valued solution concepts using interval-type payoffs for interval games ⋮ Well-posedness and existence for the weak multicriteria Nash equilibrium of multicriteria games ⋮ A preemptive goal programming for multi‐objective cooperative games: an application to multi‐objective linear production ⋮ Partially ordered cooperative games: Extended core and Shapley value ⋮ Constrained weak Nash-type equilibrium problems ⋮ The truncated core for games with upper bounds ⋮ Efficiency in uncertain cooperative games ⋮ A multi‐objective model for bank ATM networks ⋮ Core, least core and nucleolus for multiple scenario cooperative games ⋮ Multi-Criteria Simple Games ⋮ A general model for voting systems with multiple alternatives ⋮ Approximations and well-posedness in multicriteria games

Cites Work

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• Vector linear programming in zero-sum multicriteria matrix games
• Multiple Objective Linear Programming with Interval Criterion Weights
• Stable Payment Schemes of Tu-Games With Multiple Crieria¹
• Sequential incorporation of imprecise information in multiple criteria decision processes

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