Evaluation of anonymity and confidentiality protocols using theorem proving

DOI10.1007/s10703-015-0232-5zbMath1331.68028OpenAlexW840673086MaRDI QIDQ5962971

Tarek Mhamdi, Osman Hasan, Sofiène Tahar

Publication date: 25 February 2016

Published in: Formal Methods in System Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10703-015-0232-5

zbMATH Keywords

theorem provingconfidentialityanonymitydependable systems and softwareinformation leakage

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Data encryption (aspects in computer science) (68P25) Information theory (general) (94A15) Network protocols (68M12)

Related Items

Formalization of Normal Random Variables in HOL

Uses Software

• ML
• HOL
• ETPS
• GitHub

Cites Work

• A theory of type polymorphism in programming
• An introduction to mathematical logic and type theory: To truth through proof.
• Formalization of Entropy Measures in HOL
• Assessing security threats of looping constructs
• Anonymity Protocols as Noisy Channels
• On the Foundations of Quantitative Information Flow
• On the Formalization of the Lebesgue Integration Theory in HOL
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