Participation in moral hazard problems
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Publication:5964685
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2015.11.005zbMath1347.91183OpenAlexW2271775648MaRDI QIDQ5964685
Publication date: 1 March 2016
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2064&context=buspapers
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Cites Work
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