Participation in moral hazard problems

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2015.11.005zbMath1347.91183OpenAlexW2271775648MaRDI QIDQ5964685

Guillaume Roger

Publication date: 1 March 2016

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2064&context=buspapers

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationmoral hazardprincipal-agentcontractparticipation constraint

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Spatial models in economics (91B72)

Related Items (1)

Bidding for incentive contracts

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Moral hazard with bounded payments
• Negotiation and take-it or leave-it in common agency with non-contractible actions
• The existence of optimal contracts in the principal-agent model
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• A note on common agency models of moral hazard
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• Existence and non-existence in the moral hazard problem
• Endogenous matching in a market with heterogeneous principals and agents
• Log-concave probability and its applications
• Two New Conditions Supporting the First-Order Approach to Multisignal Principal-Agent Problems
• The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• Nonlinear Pricing with Random Participation
• Arm's Length Relationships
• Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium Points for Concave N-Person Games

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