Incentive properties for ordinal mechanisms
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Publication:5964696
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2015.12.003zbMath1347.91170OpenAlexW2198514748MaRDI QIDQ5964696
Publication date: 1 March 2016
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.12.003
Related Items (22)
Probabilistic assignment: an extension approach ⋮ On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness ⋮ Equivalence of efficiency notions for ordinal assignment problems ⋮ Random assignments on sequentially dichotomous domains ⋮ Local global equivalence for unanimous social choice functions ⋮ Local vs. global strategy-proofness: a new equivalence result for ordinal mechanisms ⋮ On the equivalence of strategy-proofness and upper contour strategy-proofness for randomized social choice functions ⋮ An impossibility under bounded response of social choice functions ⋮ Random mechanism design on multidimensional domains ⋮ Where should your daughter go to college? An axiomatic analysis ⋮ The structure of (local) ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible random rules ⋮ Impossibilities for probabilistic assignment ⋮ Some characterizations of generalized top trading cycles ⋮ A unified characterization of the randomized strategy-proof rules ⋮ When is the probabilistic serial assignment uniquely efficient and envy-free? ⋮ Upper-contour strategy-proofness in the probabilistic assignment problem ⋮ On random social choice functions with the tops-only property ⋮ Partial strategyproofness: relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem ⋮ Incompatibility of efficiency and strategyproofness in the random assignment setting with indifferences ⋮ Solidarity in preference aggregation: improving on a status quo ⋮ When are efficient and fair assignment mechanisms group strategy-proof? ⋮ Random assignments on preference domains with a tier structure
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