The paradox of inference and the non-triviality of analytic information

DOI10.1007/s10992-010-9127-5zbMath1221.03010OpenAlexW2140962753MaRDI QIDQ600847

Marie Duží

Publication date: 3 November 2010

Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-010-9127-5

zbMATH Keywords

constructionhyperintensionstructured meaningtransparent intensional logicanalytic informationempirical informationparadox of inference

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05)

Related Items (9)

Extensional Logic of Hyperintensions ⋮ Constrained consequence ⋮ Extensionality and logicality ⋮ Making Sense of Sense Containment ⋮ On the number of types ⋮ Transparent quantification into hyperintensional objectual attitudes ⋮ Substitution contradiction, its resolution and the Church-Rosser theorem in TIL ⋮ If structured propositions are logical procedures then how are procedures individuated? ⋮ Substitution inconsistencies in Transparent Intensional Logic

Cites Work

• The enduring scandal of deduction. Is propositional logic really uninformative?
• Procedural semantics for hyperintensional logic. Foundations and applications of transparent intensional logic
• Predication and extensionalization
• Logical pluralism and semantic information
• The scandal of deduction. Hintikka on the information yield of deductive inferences
• Alonzo Church's Contributions to Philosophy and Intensional Logic
• Computational Logic in Multi-Agent Systems
• The complexity of theorem-proving procedures
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