When is the value of public information positive in a game?

DOI10.1016/J.JMAA.2010.08.039zbMath1198.91105OpenAlexW2080945306MaRDI QIDQ601298

Lina Mallozzi, Mitri Kitti

Publication date: 4 November 2010

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmaa.2010.08.039

zbMATH Keywords

multiple equilibriavalue of informationincomplete informationpublic informationBayesian games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Applications of game theory (91A80) Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

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• Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and Bertrand
• The value of information in a simple duopoly model
• Existence of equilibrium in Bayesian games with infinitely many players
• The value of public information in a Cournot duopoly.
• Positive value of information in games
• On the existence of equilibria to Bayesian games with non-finite type and action spaces
• Signaling and mediation in games with common interests
• What restrictions do Bayesian games impose on the value of information?
• The Strategic Role of Information on the Demand Function in an Oligopolistic Market
• Variational Analysis
• Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments

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