Collusive behavior under a leniency program

DOI10.1007/s00712-010-0140-5zbMath1197.91066OpenAlexW2064206052MaRDI QIDQ601784

Daisuke Shimizu, Ikuo Ishibashi

Publication date: 29 October 2010

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-010-0140-5

zbMATH Keywords

antitrustlaw enforcementrepeated gamescollusionleniency program

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (3)

Leniency programs under demand uncertainty: cartel stability and the duration of price wars ⋮ Mixed oligopolies and collusion ⋮ The effect of leniency programs on endogenous collusion

Cites Work

• A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, II: Price Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles
• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames

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