Bottom-up design of strategic options as finite automata
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Publication:601965
DOI10.1007/S10287-008-0084-1zbMath1197.90261OpenAlexW2052562540MaRDI QIDQ601965
Publication date: 29 October 2010
Published in: Computational Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10287-008-0084-1
Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Corporate finance (dividends, real options, etc.) (91G50)
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Cites Work
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