Learning by doing vs. learning from others in a principal-agent model
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Publication:602975
DOI10.1016/j.jedc.2010.04.007zbMath1231.91280OpenAlexW2027407290MaRDI QIDQ602975
Jasmina Arifovic, Alexander K. Karaivanov
Publication date: 5 November 2010
Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2010.04.007
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