Maintaining equilibria during exploration in sponsored search auctions

DOI10.1007/s00453-009-9318-zzbMath1198.68095OpenAlexW2108808125MaRDI QIDQ603920

Lihong Li, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, Jennifer Wortman, John Langford

Publication date: 8 November 2010

Published in: Algorithmica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.155.5621

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium analysisexplorationsponsored search auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Learning and adaptive systems in artificial intelligence (68T05) Marketing, advertising (90B60) Internet topics (68M11)

Related Items (3)

A stochastic game approach for competition over popularity in social networks ⋮ Maintaining equilibria during exploration in sponsored search auctions ⋮ Truthful learning mechanisms for multi-slot sponsored search auctions with externalities

Cites Work

• Maintaining equilibria during exploration in sponsored search auctions
• Forward looking Nash equilibrium for keyword auction
• Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error
• Probability Inequalities for Sums of Bounded Random Variables
• An incentive-compatible multi-armed bandit mechanism

This page was built for publication: Maintaining equilibria during exploration in sponsored search auctions