Gaming prediction markets: equilibrium strategies with a market maker

DOI10.1007/s00453-009-9323-2zbMath1200.91120OpenAlexW2117785059MaRDI QIDQ603926

Rica Gonen, Rahul Sami, Yiling Chen, Stanko Dimitrov, Daniel M. Reeves, David M. Pennock, Robin D. Hanson, Lance J. Fortnow

Publication date: 8 November 2010

Published in: Algorithmica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:5027877

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium behaviorbluffingmarket marker, traderprediction marketstrategic betting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

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Common knowledge equilibrium of Boolean securities in distributed information market ⋮ Strategy-proof incentives for predictions ⋮ Optimizing Bayesian Information Revelation Strategy in Prediction Markets: the Alice Bob Alice Case ⋮ An axiomatic characterization of wagering mechanisms ⋮ Convergence within binary market scoring rules ⋮ Computing equilibria of prediction markets via persuasion ⋮ An Overview of Applications of Proper Scoring Rules ⋮ Updating awareness and information aggregation ⋮ \textit{Put your money where your forecast is}: supply chain collaborative forecasting with cost-function-based prediction markets

Cites Work

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• Information, trade and common knowledge
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• Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading

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