Test Design Under Falsification

DOI10.3982/ecta16346zbMath1515.91059OpenAlexW3121981681MaRDI QIDQ6041126

Vasiliki Skreta, Eduardo Perez-Richet

Publication date: 26 May 2023

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta16346

zbMATH Keywords

testsmanipulationpersuasionfalsificationcheatinginformation design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06)

Related Items (7)

Testing, disclosure and approval ⋮ Persuasion with unknown beliefs ⋮ Communication with endogenous deception costs ⋮ Information design through scarcity and social learning ⋮ Optimal transparency of monitoring capability ⋮ Persuasion with limited communication capacity ⋮ Regret-minimizing Bayesian persuasion

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