Cooperative evolution under the joint influence of local popularity and global popularity
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Publication:6041515
DOI10.1016/j.amc.2022.127635OpenAlexW4307314314MaRDI QIDQ6041515
Ning Guo, Xiang Ling, Qing-Yi Hao, Chao-Yun Wu, Hui-Min Liao, Jia-Li Qian
Publication date: 31 May 2023
Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2022.127635
Game theory (91Axx) Mathematical economics (91Bxx) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91Dxx)
Related Items (2)
Acceptability of strategy promotes cooperation in a spatial prisoner’s dilemma game ⋮ Restoring spatial cooperation with myopic agents in a three-strategy social dilemma
Cites Work
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