Fuzzy Arrovian Theorems when preferences are complete
From MaRDI portal
Publication:6044861
DOI10.22111/ijfs.2022.7085zbMath1522.91098OpenAlexW4379534538MaRDI QIDQ6044861
Publication date: 22 May 2023
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2111.03010
coalitionsdefuzzificationfuzzy preferencesultrafiltersinfinite agentsArrovian models in the fuzzy settingmathematical social choicestrongly-connected preferences
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Fuzzy social choice theory
- Arrow's theorem and max-star transitivity
- Representability of binary relations through fuzzy numbers
- Fuzzy choice functions. A revealed preference approach
- Exact choice and fuzzy preferences
- Fuzzy preferences and social choice
- Social choice and the topology of spaces of preferences
- Structure of fuzzy binary relations
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Fuzzy preferences and Arrow-type problems in social choice
- Fractional group identification
- A new view on Arrovian dictatorship in a fuzzy setting
- Representations of preference orderings
- Existence of order-preserving functions for nontotal fuzzy preference relations under decisiveness
- Liberalism and dictatorship in the problem of fuzzy classification
- Absorbent tuples of aggregation operators
- The structure of fuzzy preferences: social choice implications
- On some oligarchy results when social preference is fuzzy
- Fuzzy strict preference and social choice
- INDEPENDENCE OF IRRELEVANT ALTERNATIVES AND FUZZY ARROW'S THEOREM
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Arrow theorems in the fuzzy setting
- Fuzzy group identification problems
This page was built for publication: Fuzzy Arrovian Theorems when preferences are complete
