Security Analysis of CPace
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Publication:6045079
DOI10.1007/978-3-030-92068-5_24zbMath1514.94027OpenAlexW4205916842MaRDI QIDQ6045079
Björn Haase, Julia Hesse, Michel Abdalla
Publication date: 26 May 2023
Published in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92068-5_24
Related Items (4)
Wireless-channel key exchange ⋮ A universally composable PAKE with zero communication cost. (And why it shouldn't be considered UC-secure) ⋮ EKE meets tight security in the universally composable framework ⋮ CHIP and CRISP: protecting all parties against compromise through identity-binding PAKEs
Cites Work
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- Security Analysis of the PACE Key-Agreement Protocol
- Decaf: Eliminating Cofactors Through Point Compression
- Efficient Indifferentiable Hashing into Ordinary Elliptic Curves
- Universally Composable Password-Based Key Exchange
- Separating succinct non-interactive arguments from all falsifiable assumptions
- Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2003
- Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2005
- Public Key Cryptography - PKC 2006
- Algorithmic Number Theory
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