Cost sharing and strategyproof mechanisms for set cover games

DOI10.1007/s10878-009-9209-xzbMath1205.91044OpenAlexW2111234732MaRDI QIDQ604756

Xiang-Yang Li, Wei Lou, Zheng Sun, Weizhao Wang

Publication date: 12 November 2010

Published in: Journal of Combinatorial Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.142.5020

zbMATH Keywords

pricingmechanism designset coverselfish agent

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Programming involving graphs or networks (90C35) Combinatorial games (91A46)

Related Items (2)

Allocating costs in set covering problems ⋮ A game theoretic approach for minimal connected dominating set

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