Pollution in strategic multilateral exchange: Taxing emissions or trading on permit markets?
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Publication:6052557
DOI10.1111/boer.12378zbMath1530.91462OpenAlexW4297982164MaRDI QIDQ6052557
Anicet B. Kabré, Ludovic A. Julien, Louis de Mesnard
Publication date: 17 October 2023
Published in: Bulletin of Economic Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/boer.12378
Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)
Cites Work
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- On preferences and taxation mechanisms in strategic bilateral exchange
- MARKET PRICE MECHANISMS AND STACKELBERG GENERAL EQUILIBRIA: AN EXAMPLE
- OPTIMAL ALLOCATION OF TRADABLE EMISSION PERMITS UNDER UPSTREAM–DOWNSTREAM STRATEGIC INTERACTION
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