Pollution in strategic multilateral exchange: Taxing emissions or trading on permit markets?

DOI10.1111/boer.12378zbMath1530.91462OpenAlexW4297982164MaRDI QIDQ6052557

Anicet B. Kabré, Ludovic A. Julien, Louis de Mesnard

Publication date: 17 October 2023

Published in: Bulletin of Economic Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/boer.12378

zbMATH Keywords

pollutionStackelberg competitionfiscal policypermit market

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Cites Work

• A note on ad valorem and per unit taxation in an oligopoly model
• ``Very nice trivial equilibria in strategic market games
• Stable trading structures in bilateral oligopolies
• ``Nice trivial equilibria in strategic market games
• Strategic complements and substitutes in bilateral oligopolies
• Bilateral oligopoly and quantity competition
• An introduction to perfect and imperfect competition via bilateral oligopoly
• On preferences and taxation mechanisms in strategic bilateral exchange
• MARKET PRICE MECHANISMS AND STACKELBERG GENERAL EQUILIBRIA: AN EXAMPLE
• OPTIMAL ALLOCATION OF TRADABLE EMISSION PERMITS UNDER UPSTREAM–DOWNSTREAM STRATEGIC INTERACTION
• Unnamed Item

This page was built for publication: Pollution in strategic multilateral exchange: Taxing emissions or trading on permit markets?