Pricing strategy and collusion in a market with delay sensitivity
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Publication:6052605
DOI10.1002/nav.21894zbMath1527.91077OpenAlexW3009647611MaRDI QIDQ6052605
Publication date: 17 October 2023
Published in: Naval Research Logistics (NRL) (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1002/nav.21894
Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
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