Public Bayesian persuasion: being almost optimal and almost persuasive

DOI10.1007/s00453-023-01123-1arXiv2002.05156MaRDI QIDQ6053476

Matteo Castiglioni, Nicola Gatti, Andrea Celli

Publication date: 27 September 2023

Published in: Algorithmica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2002.05156

zbMATH Keywords

signalingBayesian persuasioninformation structure design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Algorithms in computer science (68Wxx) Graph theory (05Cxx)

Related Items

Increasing revenue in Bayesian posted price auctions through signaling

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• The complexity and approximability of finding maximum feasible subsystems of linear relations
• Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
• Private Bayesian persuasion
• Can Almost Everybody be Almost Happy?
• Inapproximability Results for Approximate Nash Equilibria
• The complexity of promise problems with applications to public-key cryptography
• Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games
• Algorithmic Aspects of Private Bayesian Persuasion.
• Algorithmic Bayesian Persuasion
• Bayesian Exploration: Incentivizing Exploration in Bayesian Games
• Persuasion in Networks: Public Signals and Cores
• Honest signaling in zero-sum games is hard, and lying is even harder
• On the Tractability of Public Persuasion with No Externalities
• Handbook of Computational Social Choice
• A Polynomial-time Approximation Scheme for Fault-tolerant Distributed Storage
• The PCP theorem by gap amplification