Vertical cross‐ownership, input price discrimination, and social welfare
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Publication:6053617
DOI10.1111/IJET.12344zbMath1530.91272OpenAlexW4224237529MaRDI QIDQ6053617
Publication date: 23 October 2023
Published in: International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12344
Cites Work
- Product innovation transfer under passive partial ownership holdings
- Partial passive ownership holdings and licensing
- Strategic trade policy with interlocking cross-ownership
- On the pro-competitive effects of passive partial backward ownership
- Downstream competition and profits under different input price bargaining structures
- Overlapping ownership, endogenous quality, and welfare
- Downstream rivals' competition, bargaining, and welfare
- Passive cross-holding in a Stackelberg oligopoly
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