The object allocation problem with favoring upper ranks
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Publication:6053622
DOI10.1111/ijet.12343zbMath1530.91243OpenAlexW4220696281MaRDI QIDQ6053622
Publication date: 23 October 2023
Published in: International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12343
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