Setting an exam as an information design problem

DOI10.1111/ijet.12368zbMath1530.91083OpenAlexW4313396416MaRDI QIDQ6053636

Makoto Shimoji

Publication date: 23 October 2023

Published in: International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12368

zbMATH Keywords

heterogeneous beliefsBayesian persuasiongrade distributionmultiple receivers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Cites Work

• Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors
• Grading exams: 100,99,98,\(\dots \) or \(A,B,C\)?
• Pivotal persuasion
• Bayesian persuasion in unlinked games
• Competition in Persuasion