Technology licensing and collusion

DOI10.1111/ijet.12373zbMath1530.91338OpenAlexW4360869908MaRDI QIDQ6053642

Neelanjan Sen, Unnamed Author, Arghya Dutta

Publication date: 23 October 2023

Published in: International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/111639/8/MPRA_paper_111639.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

price competitiontechnology licensingcollusionCournot competitiongrim-trigger strategy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cites Work

• The profit-sharing rule that maximizes sustainability of cartel agreements
• Optimal collusion under cost asymmetry
• Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model
• On a non-cooperative theory of technology transfer
• Welfare reducing licensing.
• On the existence of pure strategy Bertrand equilibrium
• Cartel stability under quality differentiation
• Cartel Enforcement with Uncertainty about Costs
• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
• Technology licensing strategies for three cost-differential manufacturers

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