Optimal persuasion via bi‐pooling

DOI10.3982/te4663OpenAlexW4317209628MaRDI QIDQ6053645

Yakov Babichenko, Rann Smorodinsky, Takuro Yamashita, Itai Arieli

Publication date: 23 October 2023

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te4663

zbMATH Keywords

signalingextreme pointsinformation disclosureBayesian persuasionprice functionbi-poolingmean preserving contraction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Related Items (1)

Derandomization of persuasion mechanisms

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Stress tests and information disclosure
• Monotone persuasion
• Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver
• Optimal information disclosure: A linear programming approach
• Extreme Points and Majorization: Economic Applications
• Persuasion in Networks: Public Signals and Cores
• The Interval Structure of Optimal Disclosure
• Censorship as optimal persuasion

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