Slow persuasion

DOI10.3982/te5175arXiv1903.09055OpenAlexW4319991391MaRDI QIDQ6053650

Ludvig Sinander, Matteo Escudé

Publication date: 23 October 2023

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1903.09055

zbMATH Keywords

dynamicinformationviscositypersuasiongradualconstrained

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (2)

The dark side of transparency: when hiding in plain sight works ⋮ The Dynamics of Instability

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors
• On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting
• Sequential contracting with multiple principals
• Continuous-time stochastic control and optimization with financial applications
• Optimal learning before choice
• Optimal dynamic information provision
• Test design under voluntary participation
• Bayesian persuasion and information design: perspectives and open issues. Introduction to the special issue on communication and persuasion
• Undiscounted bandit games
• Persuasion with limited communication capacity
• Viscosity Solutions of Hamilton-Jacobi Equations
• Monotone Comparative Statics
• Strategic Experimentation
• Dynamic project selection
• Optimal Monitoring Design
• Mechanism Design With Aftermarkets: Cutoff Mechanisms
• Derivatives
• Convex Analysis

This page was built for publication: Slow persuasion