Pervasive signaling

DOI10.3982/te4641OpenAlexW4319991458MaRDI QIDQ6053651

Aaron L. Bodoh-Creed, B. Douglas Bernheim

Publication date: 23 October 2023

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te4641

zbMATH Keywords

online social networksmultidimensional signalingefficient information transmission

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Incentive compatibility and differentiability: new results and classic applications
• Comparative cheap talk
• A model of electoral competition with incomplete information
• A theory of decisive leadership
• Credulity, lies, and costly talk
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Social Image and the 50-50 Norm: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Audience Effects
• Strategic Communication with Lying Costs
• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
• Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with a Continuum of Types
• Simultaneous Signaling in an Oligopoly Model
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Cheap Talk With Transparent Motives
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
• Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk