Optimal information structures in bilateral trade

DOI10.3982/TE4074MaRDI QIDQ6053659

Christoph Schottmüller

Publication date: 23 October 2023

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationbilateral tradeinformation design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Trade models (91B60) Economics of information (91B44) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Related Items (2)

Shuttle diplomacy ⋮ Withholding and damage in Bayesian trade mechanisms

Cites Work

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• An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation

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