A structural analysis of simple contracts

Cites Work

On the identification of the procurement model
Optimality and renegotiation in dynamic contracting
On methods of sieves and penalization
Robust and consistent estimation of nonlinear errors-in-variables models
Weak convergence and empirical processes. With applications to statistics
The econometrics of unobservables: applications of measurement error models in empirical industrial organization and labor economics
Sieve inference on possibly misspecified semi-nonparametric time series models
Nonparametric Identification and Estimation of Nonadditive Hedonic Models
The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts
Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
Asymptotic Statistics
Identification of Nonseparable Models Using Instruments With Small Support
Nonparametric Identification of a Contract Model With Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
Nonparametric Identification and Semiparametric Estimation of Classical Measurement Error Models Without Side Information
TESTING PASSIVE VERSUS SYMMETRIC BELIEFS IN CONTRACTING WITH EXTERNALITIES
Measuring the Welfare Gains from Optimal Incentive Regulation
The provision of wage incentives: A structural estimation using contracts variation
Nonparametric Identification of Risk Aversion in First-Price Auctions Under Exclusion Restrictions
An IV Model of Quantile Treatment Effects
Identification in Nonseparable Models
Efficient Estimation of Models with Conditional Moment Restrictions Containing Unknown Functions
Quantile Regression under Misspecification, with an Application to the U.S. Wage Structure
Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement
A practical guide to compact infinite dimensional parameter spaces
Identification and estimation of nonlinear models using two samples with nonclassical measurement errors

This page was built for publication: A structural analysis of simple contracts